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FEMALE BY OPERATION OF LAW: FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE LEGAL IMPOSITION OF SEX
INTRODUCTION
In 1949, Simone de Beauvoir shattered theories of sexual es-
sentialism' when she wrote, "[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes,
a woman."2 Since that time, feminist scholars and activists have
generally differentiated between sex and gender, "with gender being
to sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female. 3 In
other words, "[a] s most feminist theorists use the terminology, 'sex'
refers to the anatomical and physiological distinctions between men
and women; 'gender,' by contrast, is used to refer to the cultural
overlay on those anatomical and physiological distinctions. 4 The
understanding of gender as culturally constituted represents an
advance in feminist thinking over sexual essentialism, but this
construction fails to question the origin of sexual categorization and
the relationship that categorization has to the oft-referenced
"anatomical and physiological distinctions"5 between those catego-
rized as female and those categorized as male.
In America, as in nearly all other cultures, sexual categoriza-
tion occurs under the auspices of the law.6 This categorization
begins at birth,7 when each person is categorized as either male or
female.8 Opportunities are limited, obligations are dictated, and
every societal interaction operates through the context of that initial
legally-mandated sexual categorization.9 This categorization as
either male or female is generally accepted because it is understood
1. Sexual essentialism, as used here, refers to the belief that all female people are
(or should be) naturally feminine, and all male people are (or should be) naturally
masculine. See, e.g., SUZANNE J. KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN
ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 1 (1978).
2. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H. M. Parshley trans., 7th ed. 1971)
(1949).
3. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1995).
4. Id. at 10.
5. Id.
6. See Laura Grenfell, Embracing Law's Categories: Anti-Discrimination Laws and
Transgenderism, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 52 (2003).
7. See Stephen Whittle, The Becoming Man: The Law's Ass Brays, in RECLAIMING
GENDERS: TRANSSEXUAL GRAMMARS AT THE FIN DE SItCLE 15, 23-24 (Kate More &
Stephen Whittle eds., 1999).
8. Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1132 (1979).
9. See Grenfell, supra note 6, at 52.
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as reflective of an external reality: we are male or we are female;
legal categories of sex merely describe this understanding. °
THE MYTH OF BIOLOGICAL DIMORPHISM
The intelligibility of categorization as male or female is based
upon several assumptions: that there are only two sexual categories,
that the two categories are discrete and mutually exclusive, and
that the difference between the two categories gives rise to
meaning." Within the context of legal sexual categorization, the
first two assumptions hold. There are only two legal sexual catego-
ries, and these categories are recognized through statutory and
common law as discrete and mutually exclusive: a person may not
be legally classified as both male and female or as neither." The
final assumption, that sexual difference is meaningful, is much
more contested.
Sexual categorization purports to divide human bodies into two
groups and label individuals based upon membership to one group
or another. The individual legal consequences of this division are
not slight. 3 Nevertheless, the determination of sex is arbitrary:
possession of a penis (or an XY chromosome or testicles) is no more
relevant to the legal consequences of maleness than is possession of
a vagina (or an XX chromosome or ovaries).' 4 A penis has no in-
herent meaning; it is simply an organ. When an obstetrician, under
auspice of state authority, identifies a newborn as possessing a
penis and therefore labels the infant as "male," the state, through
10. See JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 37-38 (1994).
11. See Paisley Currah, The Other "Sex"in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L.J. 321, 323 (2004); see also Dunlap, supra note 8, at 1131.
12. Whether or not there should be more than two categories is outside the scope of
this note. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see generally Dunlap, supra note
8. "Legal challenges to sex-based restrictions have not questioned the presumption that
only two sexes exist. Instead, these challenges, while attacking the specific legal
differentiations at issue in each case, have assumed and relied upon the correctness and
accuracy of the two-sex presumption itself." Id. at 1138 n.46.
13. See id. at 1131-39. In addition to the infinite social consequences, a person's sex
may legally determine how they may dress, where they attend school, what bathroom
they may use, whom they may marry, whether they are subject to selective service in the
armed forces, and whether they will be compelled to bear offspring they do not want. Id.
This is important because "[w]hile interrogating the incoherence embedded in the state's
attempt to regulate the relationship between genitalia, gender identity, and gender
expression, it is also vital that we not lose track of the material consequences of such
regulation." Paisley Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and Gender Non-Conformity in the
Civil Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1363, 1367 (1997). See
generally Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision
Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 265 (1999).
14. See LORBER, supra note 10, at 38.
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the obstetrician, imposes an external meaning of maleness upon the
infant's body where no such meaning existed before.
In this way, the law "reinterprets physical features (in them-
selves as neutral as any others but marked by the social system)
through the network of relationships in which they are perceived."'"
All people are organized into one category or the other; people with-
out a distinct penis or vagina are thrust into whichever category
comes closest. 6 Beyond the initial attribution of a sex, genitals (and
chromosomes and gonads) are irrelevant to sex categories; 17 what
medical science has termed primary and secondary sex characteris-
tics are actually neutral physical features that are rendered
culturally meaningful only after a binary construction of sex is
imposed upon them.18 Professor Katherine Franke explains:
Indeed, it is almost ludicrous to maintain that sex discrimina-
tion, sexual identification, or sexual identity takes place on the
level of biology or genitals. Yet the law continues to insist that
they do and in so doing it continues to naturalize sexual dimor-
phism: the assumption that homo sapiens are divided into two
natural kinds - male and female.' 9
Based upon Franke's theory, we might reply to de Beauvoir 0 that
one is not born a woman, nor even born female; one is made a
female (and consequently made a woman) through the operation of
law.
DIFFERENCE AS JUSTIFICATION FOR SUBORDINATION
As mentioned above, this separation of people into two classes
is premised upon the concept of difference: the belief that males
and females are essentially and inexorably different and that this
difference is itself meaningful. This difference does not exist, how-
ever, outside of a binary framework. The state does not respond to
15. MONIQUE WITTIG, One Is Not Born a Woman, in THE STRAIGHT MIND AND OTHER
ESSAYS 9, 12 (1992).
16. See Suzanne J. Kessler, The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management
of Intersexed Infants, 16 SIGNS 3, 16, 18-19 (1990). Sex determination often depends upon
the size of the penile/clitoral tissue regardless of the presence or absence of a vagina, the
result being that only infants with fully developed penises are classified as male while
all others are classified as female. SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED
25-26 (1999); see also LORBER, supra note 10, at 38; Whittle, supra note 7, at 24.
17. Whittle, supra note 7, at 23.
18. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 40 (1995).
19. Id.
20. See generally DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 2.
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pre-existing biological difference with sexual categorization; rather,
it creates cultural difference by imposing sexual categorization onto
otherwise meaningless physical traits. As one scholar argues, "there
is no unambiguous sexual state of affairs outside of a discourse of
power. A person's sex becomes fixed by operation of a court order,
not by virtue of an ambiguous natural order."21 The sexual differ-
ence thus created becomes a basis for the hierarchical organization
of society:22 the myth of legitimate sexual difference serves as
justification for the wholesale subordination of the female.
All of society engages in this hegemonic23 attribution of meaning
to meaningless bodies in the creation of sexed identities. The role of
the law, however, in policing these identities is particularly striking,
since it is through the law itself that individuals seek redress for
discrimination on the basis of sex.
Attorneys and scholars have challenged the meanings of sexual
categories imposed by law, expanding statutes such as Title VII,
24
which prohibits employment "discrimination... on the basis of...
sex,"2" to prohibit an increasingly broad range of disparate treat-
ment.26 From initial cases of discrimination against women because
they are women, feminist attorneys have expanded the purview of
Title VII to include discrimination against men because they are
men,27 same-sex discrimination against men and women, 28 and
discrimination against men and women because they do not meet
their employer's expectations based upon sex stereotypes.29 Some
21. Franke, supra note 18, at 52.
22. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimina-
tion, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw 32, 40 (1987).
23. Hegemony is used here to refer to cultural or discursive power which is not
unidirectional but coercive: power implicating the members of a given group in the
propagation and perpetuation of their own oppression to the extent that they co-opt that
power. See generally SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCi
(Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
25. Id.
26. Although Title VII only applies to discrimination within the context of
employment, it is used throughout this note as an example, partly because employment
opportunity is an essential part of social equality, and partly because courts frequently
cite Title VII jurisprudence as persuasive in the interpretation of other statutes referring
to sex discrimination. See, e.g., Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215
(1st Cir. 2000) (using Title VII to interpret the Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Schwenk
v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2000) (using Title VII as a guide to
interpret the Gender Motivated Violence Act).
27. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669,
675-76, 685 (1983).
28. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) ("We
see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule
excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII.").
29. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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appellate courts have also held that Title VII prohibits discrimina-
tion based upon the gender expression of transgender employees.3"
STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE
Each of these expansions of Title VII has been based upon a
challenge to the meaning of the sexual categories imposed upon
individuals by operation of law. Although protection has effectively
expanded beyond merely the most egregious instances of disparate
treatment based upon sex, women's access to employment opportu-
nities remains substantially limited.3 Arguably, this should not be
surprising as "[a] built-in tension exists between this concept of
equality, which presupposes sameness, and this concept of sex,
which presupposes difference. Sex equality thus becomes a contra-
diction in terms, something of an oxymoron, which may suggest why
we are having such a difficult time getting it." 2
Through the arbitrary sexual classification of individuals and
the creation of difference, the law continues to be complicit in the
subordination of women. If attorneys wish to end this subordination,
"[r]ather than challenging the [sexual] categories themselves,
advocates ... ought to have a long-term strategy of challenging the
state's prerogative to define those categories."3 The remaining
question is how to accomplish this.
In addressing this issue, this note focuses upon four primary
areas: the policing of hierarchical boundaries by state actors, the
separation of sex and gender within the law, sexual difference under
Title VII, and the evolution of Title VII sex discrimination jurispru-
dence. The note will then discuss the continued subordination of
women through the law of sexual differentiation and conclude with
suggestions for possible feminist action.
THE POLICING OF HIERARCHICAL BOUNDARIES
The categorization of people is not limited to sex. As may be
readily observed, people are also classified within American society
30. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosa, 214
F.3d at 215-16; Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1197.
31. Employment Standards Admin., Dep't of Labor, Narrowing the Wage and
Opportunity Gap for All Workers, http://www.dol.gov/esa/media/reports/ofccp/equal
pay.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006) ("Despite great progress in education and work
experience over the past several decades, women still do not earn the same pay as men.
On average, women who work full-time earn only about 75 cents for every dollar that a
man earns....").
32. MACKINNON, supra note 22, at 33.
33. Currah, supra note 13, at 1368.
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based upon race, ethnicity, religion, and economic worth, among
other things. The classifications within these categories are not
mere taxonomic distinctions; they have great social consequence. In
fact, the very purpose of the categorizations is difference: the cre-
ation of distinctions between groups that may be used to justify the
subordination of one group to another. For example, racism would
hardly have existed in America as it has without the persistent
cultural belief that racial difference signifies an essential difference
going beyond one's mere appearance.34 The existence and intelligi-
bility of such categories within society requires that, as with sex,
each person be readily classifiable within a particular category and
be unable to move between different classifications. To return to the
example of racism in America, racial prejudice against blacks would
be clearly nonsensical if one could not differentiate blacks from
whites, or if blacks could choose to become white.
SuMPTuARY LAWS, BLACK CODES, AND THE REQUIREMENT OF SEX
DESIGNATION
This need for individual categorization has created, in both
society and the law, an interest in policing the boundaries between
identity categories. This anxiety with maintaining hierarchical
order has been present throughout Western history.35 In medieval
Europe, Elizabethan England, and colonial America, sumptuary
laws - enforcing different dress codes for people of different eco-
nomic classes - were intended to ensure clear class distinctions
during times when economic change threatened to blur class lines.36
In other words, these dress code laws "sought to ensure social leg-
ibility and enforce social hierarchy."3
It is useful to begin this discussion with sumptuary laws;
through these statutes, the law clearly sorts people by social class
and then imposes restrictions and rights on people based upon that
sorting. The artificiality of the categorization is perhaps most clear
in the case of sumptuary laws. While most people recognize that
34. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 19, 31 (1994).
35. See, e.g., MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING AND CULTURAL
ANXIETY 25 (1992) (discussing this idea in the context of sumptuary laws).
36. See id. at 25-26 ("The ideal scenario - from the point of view of the regulators
- was one in which a person's social station, social role, gender and other indicators of
identity in the world could be read, without ambiguity or uncertainty.'); Jennifer L. Levi,
Paving the Road: A Charles Hamilton Houston Approach to Securing Trans Rights, 7
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5, 19 (2000).
37. GARBER, supra note 35, at 26; see also Levi, supra note 36, at 19.
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class status is not an immutable characteristic, people, generally,
and courts, particularly, ascribe to the view that race and sex are
immutable characteristics." As a result, people who seem to cross
between categories of race or sex produce an even greater anxiety
than those crossing class categories under sumptuary laws.
The Black Codes, passed in a number of states following the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,39 ensured that "criminal
laws were applied discriminatorily against blacks."4° Other discrimi-
natory laws "included such punishments as lynching, castration,
and beating for blacks who did not adhere to white-supremacist
social norms."'4 ' These laws were enacted in order to ensure that
supposed differences between whites and blacks would remain
legible even after slavery was abolished. 42 Later, these "black codes
became the framework for segregation statutes '43 that required
separate public facilities for blacks and whites.44 Both black codes
and social segregation laws were premised upon the belief that
blacks were significantly different from whites, and that the dif-
ference was so crucial to social organization that it should be
enforced by law. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Education45 in 1954, laws aiming to discriminate among
people of different races were no longer supportable.46
The same may not be said of laws distinguishing people on the
basis of sex. Every state and territory of the United States requires
sex categorization to be determined at birth and then recorded with
an agency charged with the collection of vital statistics.4" This initial
sex designation follows each individual throughout her or his life,
stamped upon driver's licenses, passports, marriage certificates, and
numerous other legal documents.4' As previously noted, this desig-
nation is not without consequence. Once set, an individual's sex
designation may not be easily altered, and may not be altered at all
in some jurisdictions.49
38. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 148 (Aspen
Law & Business 1999); Lopez, supra note 34, at 7.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
40. Otis B. Grant, Rational Choice or Wrongful Discrimination? The Law and
Economics of Jury Nullification, 14 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L. J. 145, 149 (2004).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 148-49.
43. Id. at 149 (citing Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L.
REv. 77, 90 (1985)).
44. See Finkelman, supra note 43, at 90, 97-101 (discussing the segregation laws).
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. Id.
47. Grenfell, supra note 6, at 52.
48. Greenberg, supra note 13, at 308-17.
49. Id. (discussing New York, Ohio, and Oregon).
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Sumptuary laws, black codes, and sex designation statutes all
require that the distinctions between classifications be clear and
intelligible. To the extent that members of opposing classes seem
distinct, these laws may even seem justifiable. ° It is not always pos-
sible to easily classify people, however. To the extent that a person
is not recognizable as a member of any race, or of either sex, it is
hardly justifiable to impose upon the person race-specific or sex-
specific restrictions or obligations. In order to preserve the artificial
order created through race and sex, courts have been the arbiters of
contested classifications.
RACE DETERMINATION TRIALS
In the pre-Civil War South, one's race was almost always the
difference between living as a free person and being enslaved. As
Ariela J. Gross noted, "the possibility of ambiguity created by people
of contested racial identity was a source of great anxiety to white
Southerners, who expended a great deal of energy trying to foreclose
the possibility of white slaves, 'passing' blacks, and the interracial
sex that lay behind both."51 In her work, Professor Gross examines
numerous trials in which the race of a particular person was an
important issue before the court:
Trials . . .at which the central issue became the
determination of a person's racial identity, were a
regular occurrence in Southern county courts in the
nineteenth century. While nineteenth-century white
Southerners may have believed in a racial "essence"
inhering in one's blood, there was no agreement about
how to discover it.52
In these trials, juries decided the question of race as a matter of
fact.53 Generally, evidence of the person's racial ancestry was pre-
sented, if available.54 The evidence also generally included a
complete inspection of the body of the person whose race was at
issue, with reference to skin tone, hair texture, foot size, nose width,
50. Franke, supra note 18, at 2 (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)).
51. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 122 (1998).
52. Id. at 111 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 111, 141-42.
54. See generally id. (noting throughout that the parties in one case focused on this
factor during trial).
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and lip shape.5" Where the physical features of a person did not
clearly indicate one race or another and where racial ancestries
were unavailable or unclear, as was often the case in matters that
actually reached the trial level, juries were frequently instructed to
determine race based upon the behavior of the person in question
and whether it comported with stereotypes for one race or the other.56
In these cases, race was an external categorization, not an
immutable truth written upon the body of a particular person. As
one scholar explains, "[r]ace is revealed as historically contingent,
socially mediated systems of meaning that attach to elements of an
individual's morphology and ancestry."5 To suggest that race is
neither essential nor immutable is not to suggest that it is not real.
Rather, as anybody who has been the victim of racial discrimination
or stereotyping will attest, the effects of racial categorization are
very real indeed. This categorization is, however, the result of a
normative state interest in maintaining current social stratification
rather than the result of any pre-determined social natural order.
Importantly, although the state continues to engage in the categori-
zation of people by race, the civil rights movement and the ever-
growing presence of people of multiple racial ancestries have had the
effect of limiting the legal imposition of a structure of difference upon
racial identities. For example, racial difference is no longer recog-
nized as an acceptable reason for disparate treatment in employment
(i.e., race may never be a bona fide occupational qualification).58
SEX DETERMINATION TRIALS
Although movements for women's rights have a long and
impressive history within America, these movements have not been
able to deconstruct the myth of sexual difference through people of
indeterminate sex as has been partially done through people of
"mixed" race. There are certainly individuals whose bodies do not fit
the normative categorization of male or female, but, as has been
noted, those people are nevertheless thrust into one category or
another.59 Rather than consider the potential inadequacies of the
categories themselves, medical science and the law uphold the
concept of a binary sex system by arguing instead that the bodies of
55. Id. at 139.
56. See, e.g., id. at 111, 132, 137-38, 147-48.
57. Lopez, supra note 34, at 38-39.
58. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
59. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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intersexed individuals are inadequate. 60 Courts seem willing, in fact,
to go to very great lengths to distinguish any individuals who seem
to transgress sexual categorization as aberrations. 61 This is nowhere
more apparent than in the twentieth century sex determination
cases of transgender62 litigants.
Sexual categorization has many important legal ramifications
ranging from marriage to estate division to the enforcement of pro-
hibitions against discrimination.3 In nearly all of these cases, the
sexual categorization of the parties is assumed without question.
For example, courts generally assume that a plaintiff alleging that
she has been discriminated against because she is a woman is in
fact legally female.' This is not so in all cases.65 Professor Richard
Storrow argues:
[Tihe legal establishment . . . insists that sex is a
simple matter of biology, anatomy, or chromosomes.
Where these criteria point to different sexes [in the
case of a transsexual litigant], the court hearing the
matter chooses whichever criterion will most damage
the viability of a transsexual's sex discrimination
claim.... Ironically, however, this legal approach to
sex discrimination is itself merely borrowed from
medicine. In essence, then, in such cases the judiciary
is ... engaging in selective use of the criteria medicine
deems relevant to the determination of sex.'
60. See Whittle, supra note 7, at 24.
61. See Richard F. Storrow, Gender Typing in Stereo: The Transgender Dilemma in
Employment Discrimination, 55 ME. L. REV. 117, 126-27 (2003).
62. The term "transgender" is used throughout this note as an umbrella term to refer
to people whose sex/gender identities do not adhere to a binary categorization system of
male/female or masculine/feminine as determined by genitals, chromosomal constitution,
or gonads - people whose identities defy the expectation that those labeled at birth as
male will be masculine and men, and that those labeled at birth as female will be
feminine and women. This includes, but is not limited to, male-to-female and female-to-
male transsexuals, masculine women, feminine men, drag performers, cross-dressers,
and gender ambiguous, gender variant, and self-identified transgender people. See
PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLIcYMAKERS 3-6 (2000), available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/transeq.pdf.
63. See generally Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The
Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37 (2000).
64. Storrow, supra note 61, at 126-27.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 127.
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As several commentators have illustrated, there is no consistent
legal standard for determining a person's sex once it is in dispute.67
Courts tend to recognize the same factors as worthy of consideration
(genitals, gonads, chromosomal composition, ability to produce
offspring, and overall physical appearance)," but courts have not
reached a consensus regarding how these factors should be weighed
when they seem to point to multiple or different sex designations.69
Some courts eschew medical evidence altogether, referring instead
to Judeo-Christian Creationism.7" Importantly, no courts have
deferred to those with greatest knowledge of the matter: the
transgender litigants themselves.71 Instead, courts have consistently
maintained the right to designate a person as male or female, even
over that person's objection, sometimes with quite unexpected
results.72
Unlike judicial race determination in the nineteenth century,
determination of an individual's sex has not been reserved for juries
as a question of fact; rather, American courts73 have determined sex
categorization as a matter of law.74 This approach may be due in
part to the fact that the elements of sexual categorization as
described above are not generally in dispute in sex determination
cases (i.e., both parties will generally stipulate to the genitals, go-
nads, etc., of the person in question)." It also reveals, however, that
67. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Nevins, Getting Dirty: A Litigation Strategy for Challenging
Sex Discrimination Law by Beginning with Transsexualism, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 383, 397-98 (1998). "As the courts' varied jurisprudence demonstrates,
the whole category of what constitutes sex is up for grabs." Id. at 398. See also Anna
Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A Challenge for Feminist Legal
Theory, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 31-32 (2003) (illustrating this point through several
judges' opinions in the case of Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel v. INS 2000, 225 F.3d 1084
(9th Cir. 2000)).
68. See, e.g., Whittle, supra note 7, at 23-24.
69. See, e.g., Nevins, supra note 67, at 397-98; see also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742
F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-
27 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 n.3-4 (9th Cir.
1977).
70. Sex is "immutably fixed by our Creator at birth." Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d
223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999).
71. See Phyllis Randolph Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have
Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1031, 1032
(2001).
72. See id. (discussing inadvertent allowance of same-sex marriage in Texas and
Oregon through inconsistent sex-determination standards).
73. The American approach is not universal; in other countries, such as Australia,
sex is considered an issue of fact to be determined by a fact finder rather than an issue
of law. See Greenberg, supra note 13, at 270 n.20 (citing R. v. Cogley [1989] V.L.R. 823).
74. See Franke, supra note 18, at 98.
75. See, e.g., Phyllis Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights vs. The
Cider House Rules: Transgenders Struggle with the Courts over What Clothing They Are
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while sexual categories have great legal significance, the act of
categorization is not merely reflective of the facts of an unambigu-
ous physiology. Sexual categorization is a legal imposition of rights
and responsibilities, for which physiological features serve as
justification.
PRODUCTIVE JUDICIAL LANGUAGE
The result of determining an individual's sex is not to ascertain
the truth about an unclear state of affairs; it is to create that state
of affairs through judicial fiat. In other words, in deciding that an
individual is male or female, a judge does not review evidence of the
body to determine where sex is written upon it or made clear. Rath-
er, the judicial determination is what writes sex onto the body.
The distinction that should be made here is between descriptive and
productive language: judicial determination of sex (and race)
operates through productive language. Professor Franke explains
this phenomenon by describing the two types of judicial statements:
When the court describes a state of affairs it has a
responsibility to do so as accurately as possible, yet
when the court pronounces a verdict or legal judgment
we understand that action to be an externally sanc-
tioned exercise of power. In the first case, the aspira-
tion is that the judge's words fit the world, whereas in
the second case the world is changed to fit the judge's
words. In other words, the true conditions of a descrip-
tion are independent of the speech act itself, whereas
a pronouncement of guilt is true "because I said so."76
Thus, a transgender litigant who is determined during the course of
a legal proceeding to be male is legally male. This is particularly
insidious because it is not acknowledged. Despite the fact that no
standard has been developed for legally determining one's sex and
that it is possible for different courts to reach different conclusions
regarding the legal sex of the same individual, each court couches
Allowed to Wear on the Job, Which Restroom They Are Allowed to Use on the Job, Their
Right to Marry, and the Very Definition of Their Sex, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133,
136 (2000) (illustrating that the parties agree that an individual has a vagina and XY
chromosomes - the factual questions - and yet still disagree about the individual's sex
- the legal question).
76. Franke, supra note 18, at 51.
FEMALE BY OPERATION OF LAW
these decisions in the language of biological determinism, professing
that it has merely determined what a given person's sex already is."
Transgender sex determination cases provide a particularly
poignant example of the ways in which the law polices the borders
of sexual categories, but other examples abound. Just as class
distinctions have been enforced throughout much of Western history
by sumptuary laws, sex distinctions have also been enforced by laws
pertaining to acceptable dress for each sex.78 The number of such
laws grew exponentially in America in the 1960s until nearly every
major urban area had restrictions against individuals wearing
clothing thought inappropriate for their sex.7" Thus, "[bly establish-
ing and enforcing appropriate sartorial norms, these laws [against
cross-dressing] are designed to ensure social and sexual legibility
within a language of difference .. . ."' These laws still exist on the
books of many municipalities, though they are not enforced." Their
existence and former enforcement are strong examples of the ways
in which the law abridges individual rights in order to ensure social
intelligibility within a framework supporting oppression.
THE SEPARATION OF SEX AND GENDER WITHIN THE LAW
The use of "gender" as a term within the law that is distinct
from "sex" is a relatively recent phenomenon. The fact that both
terms have long been used within court decisions does not mean
that courts viewed the terms as distinct.8 2 The employment law
practiced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg prior to her Supreme Court ap-
pointment is "in large part responsible for the fact that the words
'sex' and 'gender' are now used interchangeably in the law .... "
Ginsburg changed all references in her court briefs from "sex" to
"gender" because she was concerned that, "[flor impressionable
minds, the word 'sex' may conjure up improper images.... ."' This
77. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Smith
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977).
78. See Franke, supra note 18, at 61.
79. See, e.g., id. at 61-69.
80. Id. at 61.
81. See Franke, supra note 18, at 60.
82. Case, supra note 3, at 10.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and
1974 Terms, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 1 n.1). Reportedly, Ginsburg switched terminology to
avoid distracting Supreme Court justices while she was making oral arguments before
the Court because they were the "impressionable minds" about whom she was concerned.
See id.
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soon widespread conflation of sex and gender as categories in
litigation effaced any distinction between sex categorization and
sex-differentiated behavior.85
Judges and legal scholars have more recently argued that it is
inappropriate to use "sex" as synonymous with "gender" because, as
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia famously noted, "[t]he word
'gender' has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or
attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics)
distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is
to female and masculine is to male."' This has become the dominant
understanding of sex and gender within American jurisprudence, 7
and has been touted by some as a feminist advancement.' Although
this may represent a short term victory, the social categorization of
"sex" is, in fact, still indistinct from "gender": both refer to cultural
expectations society and the law have about people, not to mere
physiological features.
The effect of using two different terms within society and the
law is merely to distinguish between those cultural expectations we
legitimize (sex) and those we do not (gender). Instead of arguing
that all females must be feminine, courts now view sex and gender
as distinct, and understand that females need not be feminine. This
shift prevents us from asking the more fundamental question:
whether all people who have XX chromosomes, vaginas, and ovaries
need be female. Presenting gender as socially constructed allows the
continued assertion that sex is natural. This distinction is reflected
in the law. For example, while Title VII jurisprudence has evolved
to prohibit discrimination against female employees for failing to
meet their employer's stereotypical expectations about women,89 it
does not prohibit discrimination against female employees whose
employers justify disparate impact by pointing to normatively
accepted differences between the sexes. s
85. Currah, supra note 13, at 1371-72 (citing Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring
up Your Kids Gay, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET 69-71 (Michael Warner ed., 1993)); see
also Case, supra note 3, at 10.
86. Case, supra note 3, at 11 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,
157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 13-15.
89. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
90. See E.E.O.C. v. H.S. Camp & Sons, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 411, 445 (M.D. Fla. 1982);
see also Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations
of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 124, 127
(Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
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SEXUAL DIFFERENCE UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
with fifteen or more employees from taking any employment action
against an employee "because of such individual's... sex."'" Title
VII was proposed in 1964 in response to demands for statutory
protection against discrimination on the basis of race.92 "Sex" was
added to the bill by a Southern Congress member in what has been
described as a last minute attempt to block the bill's passage. 3
Because there was very little debate about the addition of "sex" to
the bill,94 the lack of legislative history regarding congressional
intent and the meaning of "sex" as used within Title VII is remark-
able." In 1977, the Ninth Circuit held that Congress's intent in
including "sex" in Title VII was to "remedy the economic deprivation
of women .... ,, One year later, the Fifth Circuit reasoned in Smith
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. that Congress had included sex
"only to guarantee equal job opportunities for males and females.9 7
The Seventh Circuit adopted the same reasoning in 1984, stating
that the lack of evidence regarding any Congressional intent to
adopt a broad understanding of sex compelled the court to interpret
the term narrowly.9"
This narrow interpretation of "sex" has changed substantially
in the four decades since Title VII's passage. Amid varied and
evolving interpretations of the meaning of "sex," two things have
remained unchanged. First, courts continue to hold that some
disparate treatment on the basis of sex is permissible, with the
91. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
92. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1111, 1113 (1971) [hereinafter
Developments].
93. Id. at 1167. Arguably, "sex" was added not as an attempt to block the passage of
Title VII, but as an attempt to preempt passage of the concurrently proposed Equal
Rights Act, which would have provided far broader protections for women. See Franke,
supra note 18, at 23-24.
94. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATWVE HISTORY OF
TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CML RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 3213-32 (Clifford L. Alexander
ed., 1964) (demonstrating the very brief discussion in the House of the addition of "sex"
under Title VII); see also Developments, supra note 92, at 1167 (noting that the addition
of protection for sex-based discrimination "came without even a minimum of
congressional investigation").
95. Developments, supra note 92, at 1167; see also Holloway v. Andersen & Co., 566
F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting the "dearth of legislative history" regarding sex
discrimination under Title VII).
96. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 552.
97. Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978).
98. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
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justification that women actually are different from men.99 Second,
courts have not questioned the concept of sexual categorization
itself. °°
In determining whether Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination applies to a particular employment action, courts
effectively draw a line between employer actions based on difference
and those based on discrimination, with conduct on the "difference"
side of the line permitted, while conduct on the "discrimination" side
is proscribed.'01 In other words, although employers may not gen-
erally discriminate against women in employment, they may do so
if they can show that women are differently situated than men with
respect to the primary responsibilities of the position in question;
thus, sex may serve as a bona fide occupational qualification. 10 2 In
determining whether women are thus differently situated, courts
have deferred to the subjective views of the employer that women
would be unable to perform the essential functions of a particular
job. 0 3
This is striking because race, unlike sex, may never be asserted
as a bona fide occupational qualification.0 4 While both race and sex
are considered to be immutable characteristics, courts have held
that whites and minorities are similarly situated in all contexts
under the law, whereas females and males are not.'0 5
It was this fact of sexual difference that justified less-
than-heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications.
In other words, the Court built its sex-based equality
99. Franke, supra note 18, at 26.
100. See Dunlap, supra note 8, at 1138 n.46.
101. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1997).
103. See Schultz, supra note 90, at 127 n.193 (citing E.E.O.C. v. H.S. Camp & Sons,
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 411, 446-47 (M.D. Fla. 1982)):
[A] meat processing plant explicitly barred women from a number of
departments, on the ground that the jobs there were too physically
demanding for women. The court accepted this reasoning, even though
the company produced no evidence other than the owner's subjective
opinion that women were incapable of doing these jobs.
104. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
105. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-36 (citing violence within Alabama prisons
and concern that female prison guards would be exposed to sex offenders and other
inmates deprived of contact with women, the Supreme Court upheld as a bona fide
occupational qualification Alabama's requirement that prison guards who have contact
with prisoners be of the same sex as the prisoners). Notably, no amount of violence
would support a finding that a same-race prison guard requirement was a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). If minority prison guards were in particular danger
within prisons, the state would be required to make the prisons safer, rather than simply
exclude the minority guards.
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jurisprudence on the presumption that, on a funda-
mental level, males and females are not similarly
situated - they are in fact different kinds of beings. 6
The presumption of actual difference between men and women has
served as justification for women's subordination through the law:
"[i]n the name of avoiding 'the grossest discrimination,' that is,
'treating things that are different as though they are exactly alike,'
sexual equality jurisprudence has uncritically accepted the validity
of biological sexual differences."' '
This emphasis on difference has not changed throughout the
evolution of Title VII jurisprudence, though the precise contents of
that difference have changed. Courts originally interpreted Title VII
to only protect women against blatant "women need not apply"
employment discrimination. 10' Since then, the interpretation of "sex"
within Title VII has been expanded.
THE EVOLUTION OF TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION
JURISPRUDENCE
Fifteen years after the passage of Title VII, the Supreme Court
held that Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination extended to
men as well as women."0 9 In Newport News Shipbuilding, the Court
reasoned that Title VII permits employers to disparately treat men
and women only when that treatment is reflective of actual sexual
difference and that men could be harmed by unwarranted disparate
treatment just as women could be harmed." 0 The Court did not
explain, however, what would constitute actual sexual difference
justifying disparate treatment.
It had been held by courts throughout much of this jurispru-
dence that sex-based discrimination, whether overt or based upon
sex stereotypes, was the result of the discriminator's impermissible
animus toward people of the discriminated-against sex."' Thus,
employers were able to defend charges of sex discrimination by
106. Franke, supra note 18, at 11.
107. Id. at 2 (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)).
108. See, e.g., CHAMALLAS, supra note 38, at 48 (discussing Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974), in which the Court held that excluding pregnancy from a disability benefits
program did not constitute sex discrimination).
109. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 685
(1983).
110. Id. at 677-84.
111. E.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
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showing that the discriminator was of the same sex as the person
who suffered an adverse employment action.112
Change came in 1998 when the Supreme Court decided Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.113 In that case, the plaintiff was
a roustabout on an offshore oil rig that happened to employ only
men.'14 During the time he was employed, Oncale was subjected to
repeated accusations of homosexuality, numerous sexual comments,
several physical assaults, and threats of sexual violence from other
members of the crew." 5 After reporting this harassment to the
company human resources director with the result that no action
was taken,1 ' Oncale quit, asking that his pink slip reflect that he
left for fear of sexual violence." 7 The employer's primary defense in
this case was that Oncale's claim was not actionable under Title VII
because he had been harassed by other men, who presumably were
not motivated by sex-based animus against males." 8 The Court held
that so long as the harassment had been "because of ... sex,""' 9 it
need not be motivated specifically by sexual desire. 2 ° In so holding,
the Court implicitly broadened the interpretation of "because of...
sex"'' to include cases in which the victim's sex provided the means
of the alleged discrimination or harassment, regardless of the
motives of the discriminator.
Six years after Newport News Shipbuilding, 22 in 1989, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of sex stereotyping under Title
VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 23 There, the Court held that in
addition to discrimination against women because they are women
and discrimination against men because they are men, Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination also protects employees from
discrimination because they fail to meet their employer's sex
stereotype expectations for how a person of their sex should act.'24
112. See generally id. (discussing how no justifiable reason exists for allowing
harassment simply because the harasser is the same sex as the victim and overruling
the lower court's acceptance of this previously successful defense).
113. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
114. Id. at 77.
115. Id.
116. Id. In fact, the supervisor indicated that he, too, had been "picked on." Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 78-80.
119. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
120. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
122. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
123. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
124. Id. at 235, 251.
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Ann Hopkins was an aggressively successful senior accounting
associate at Price Waterhouse who had been nominated for partner-
ship."'2 When she was not selected for partnership, it was suggested
that she act and dress more femininely and "take a course at charm
school" to improve her chances. 116 Price Waterhouse asserted that
Hopkins had been denied partnership because she was abrasive and
overly aggressive.'27 In its holding, the Court responded by stating
that "[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."'28 Because
of the precedent set in Newport New Shipbuilding,'29 this prohibi-
tion against employment decisions based upon sex stereotyping
applies to men as well as women.
The Sixth Circuit has recently used Price Waterhouse"10 as a
foundation for holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination
against men or women because they do not meet their employer's
sex stereotype expectations, regardless of whether the stereotypes
are based upon the employee's actual or perceived sex.'' In Smith
v. Salem, a firefighter with a long history of commendable service
was suspended and harassed in an attempt by Salem city officials
to force his"2 resignation after learning that he planned to undergo
sex reassignment procedures and begin living as a woman.133 Smith
claimed discrimination on the basis of sex, alleging that he had been
suspended because his gender presentation did not match his
employer's expectations of men.13 The trial court nevertheless held
that Smith failed to state a claim of sex discrimination and that
Title VII does not protect employees from discrimination on the
basis of transgender status.' In rejecting this argument, the Sixth
Circuit stated that such an approach had been "eviscerated by Price
Waterhouse.""' 6 Although this represents a substantial reinterpre-
tation of "because of... sex,"' 7 the Sixth Circuit's holding in this
125. Id. at 233.
126. Id. at 235.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 250.
129. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
130. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
131. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2004).
132. Masculine pronouns are used here in order to be consistent with the plaintiffs
own usage in his appellate briefs, although that usage may have been purely strategic.
See id. at 567.
133. Id. at 568.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 571.
136. Id. at 573 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
137. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
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case is at odds with every other circuit that has addressed this issue
within an employment discrimination context," as well as with other
cases from the Sixth Circuit itself.'39 The Supreme Court has not yet
addressed this issue.
1 40
THE CONTINUED SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN
Each of these shifts in Title VII 14 1 jurisprudence has extended
further protections against sex-based discrimination in employment,
but the societal effect of these changes is slight when compared to
the discrimination and oppression still faced by women. This is due,
at least in part, to the fact that prohibiting discrimination against
a person because she is female does nothing to challenge the right
of the state to impose femaleness upon that person: the prohibition
takes the sex categorization as a given without analyzing the ways
in which that categorization itself may be oppressive.'42 Traditional
feminist approaches to anti-discrimination litigation have not been,
and will not be, sufficient to address the role the law itself plays in
societal discrimination against women.
The role of the law in the subordination of women is not acciden-
tal or coincidental. The state's enforcement of arbitrary categorization
on the basis of (generally distinguishable but irrelevant) physical
features divides society into two classes of people: males and females.
These two classes are not in parity.1 13 By categorizing some people as
female, the law writes onto their bodies a centuries-old history of
oppression and subjugation. Femaleness as a concept is understood
in terms of that history, and, in turn, individuals categorized as
female are read within the context of that history.'44 Similarly, by
categorizing some people as male, the law writes onto their bodies
a centuries-old history of supremacy and power: because maleness
is understood in terms of that history, individuals identified as male
are also associated with it.' 45 The law legitimizes this conflation of
history and identity by perpetuating essentialist understandings of
138. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 1984); Smith
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977).
139. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98 Fed.Appx. 461 (6th Cir. 2004).
140. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 2004).
141. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
142. Currah, supra note 13, at 1368.
143. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW supra note 22, at 46, 51.
144. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM,
DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAw 110 (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999) (1991).
145. See id.
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sex and deferring to supposed sexual difference as a defense to
discriminatory actions.
This creates quite a dilemma for feminist activists and attor-
neys. It is impossible to oppose sex discrimination through statutes
such as Title VII without appealing to the very foundation upon
which the concept of sex discrimination is built. Nevertheless, to
forego opposition to sex discrimination through Title VII (and
similar statutes) would be the equivalent of foregoing all opposition
to sex discrimination: there is little remedy outside of the law. This
begs the question of how feminists can seek the expansion of
protections under Title VII while simultaneously disclaiming reli-
ance upon the premises of Title VII.
POSSIBILITIES FOR FEMINIST ACTION
One answer to this dilemma may be that instead of opposing
sex discrimination directly, feminists should oppose the foundation
of that discrimination: the authority of the state to enforce sexual
categorization. Although working towards re-signification of what
it means to be male or female may be a productive short term goal
under Title VII, it still relies upon the premise that one can be either
male or female. Rather, this note proposes that feminist activists
should work towards the termination of state-enforced sexual cate-
gorization altogether. As Paisley Currah exhorted in an action plan
for the civil rights of sexual minorities, "[r]ather than challenging the
categories themselves, advocates of the rights of sexual minorities
ought to have a long-term strategy of challenging the state's preroga-
tive to define those categories."'" Or, in other words, feminists should
engage themselves in the "radical project of replacing the state's
authority to define sex and gender .... ."' Unfortunately, Currah
did not address what work that radical project would entail or how
to approach the task.148
In understanding the "state's prerogative to define"'149 sexual
categories, it is instructive to look to the state's designation of racial
and socio-economic categories as well, as those categories are much
more easily challenged than sex. As with race and class, a challenge
to sex categorization must begin at those sites where the state
enforces categorization. In the case of sex, the primary sites of this
categorization and enforcement are mandatory sex designations on
146. Currah, supra note 13, at 1368.
147. Id. at 1364.
148. See generally id.
149. Id. at 1368.
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birth certificates and laws prohibiting sex designation from being
altered on birth certificates, sex determination trials in which myths
of biological essentialism are used to justify unilateral judicial
pronouncement of sex, and dress code laws where the social
signifiers of sexual categorization are policed. The right of the state
to police sexual categorization must be challenged at each of these
sites if feminist activists are to disrupt the legal foundations of
women's subordination.
This is not an argument for the abolition of sex. Rather, this is
an argument for the removal of the state from the determination of
sex. Subordination is implicit in the concept of sex only so long as
sexual difference is treated as essential and meaningful. It is
possible to assert that sexual difference is a social construction with
no inherent meaning while acknowledging that sexual identities are
rife with meaning. This distinction rests on the difference between
biological and cultural meaning. If this distinction is difficult to
imagine as pertains to sex, the example of race may be of use. Race
differentiation may easily be understood as a meaningless biological
distinction, but a very meaningful cultural distinction: being
associated with a group that has endured a particular class history
is meaningful in a way that skin tone and hair type are not.
Similarly, being associated with femaleness is meaningful in a way
that ovaries and XX chromosomes are not. The goal of feminist
activism must then be to dismantle compulsory sex classification on
the basis of gonads and chromosomes. This feminist vision provides
room for those who would still label themselves as male or female
in order to utilize the meanings that come with those labels, but the
point is that they label themselves: they accept the classification of
their own volition.
By successfully challenging the state's authority to regulate sex
on birth certificates, by judicial fiat, and through dress code laws,
feminist activists may create a space for self-identification in terms
of sex. A utopian end to this project would be a society in which sex
is no longer listed on infants' birth certificates, sex determination
cases never reach trial because the determination is made based
upon each individual's preference, and sumptuary laws are voided.
This extreme goal is probably unachievable and may actually bring
its own negative consequences,15 ° but legal activism in the direction
of that goal would be positive.
150. Grenfell, supra note 6, at 54 ('The ideal of eliminating difference imports the
problem of encouraging assimilation.').
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To the extent that such work would break apart the coherency
of the concept of sex within the law and expose "male" and "female"
as less than discrete or definite categories, it would serve as a means
to a feminist end. To return to Title VII, in terms of employment
prestige and compensation, the so-called "gap between the sexes" is
only as wide as the gap between "male" and "female." Similarly,
within Title VII litigation, the inability of judges to draw a line
between men and women results in an inability to draw a line
between difference and discrimination in weighing a plaintiffs
claim. Within this model, any employment action that touches upon
sex must be prohibited: a change that could produce, in and of itself,
a sort of feminist utopia.
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